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I. INTRODUCTION

Justice Scalia’s death has already produced a host of commentary
on his career. Reactions run the gamut from hostile commentary 1 to
President Obama’s muted comments about his death2 to the full-throated
praise from some right-wing commentators. 3 This symposium takes a
∗ Distinguished Professor of Law, the University of Pacific McGeorge School of Law; University of
Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I want to extend special thanks to
McGeorge Law students Samantha Huynh and Stella Huynh for their capable research assistance.
1. Jacob Gershman, Judge Posner: ‘I Regard Posthumus Encomia for Scalia as Absurd,’
WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (June 27, 2016, 1:53 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/06/27/judgeposner-i-regard-posthumous-encomia-for-scalia-as-absurd; Jeffrey Toobin, Looking Back, THE NEW
YORKER (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/29/antonin-scalia-lookingbackward.
2. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Passing of the U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/02/13/remarks-president-passing-us-supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia.
3. Diana L. Banister, Justice Scalia’s Life and Death Should be an Example to
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more scholarly approach than have many commentators and asks for an
assessment of his impact on criminal law and procedure.
Depending on the issue, Justice Scalia’s legacy is quite
complicated. For example, Justice Stevens presented a lecture at
Washington University in which he discussed Justice Scalia’s role in
establishing a defendant’s right to a jury determination of aggravating
factors that resulted in sentence enhancements. 4 Justice Scalia also
forced the Court to rethink the meaning of the Confrontation Clause,
adding protection for criminal defendants. 5 Elsewhere, notably in his
Fourth Amendment case law, Justice Scalia’s views have had an
accordion effect, expanding some Fourth Amendment protections while
narrowing other protections. Thus, while claiming that the Court had
never abandoned trespass law as defining the meaning of a search, he
reestablished its relevance in defining whether a search took place in
United States v. Jones. 6 At the same time, he did not abandon the Katz v.
United States’ 7 reasonable expectation of privacy formulation. 8 But he
also wrote a concurring opinion in Acevedo v. California 9 in which he
emphasized his views about decoupling the definition of reasonableness
from the warrant requirement. Still more dramatically, he wrote the slim
majority opinion in Hudson v. Michigan, 10 signaling a narrowing of the
exclusionary rule.
Justice Scalia’s commitment to originalism explains at least some
of his pro-defendant positions. 11 Some of his supporters point to such
examples to support a claim that Justice Scalia was principled in his
application of his jurisprudential philosophy. 12
This Article focuses on an area where Justice Scalia was an
Washington’s Career Politicians, FOX NEWS (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/
opinion/2016/02/24/justice-scalia-s-life-and-death-should-be-example-to-washington-s-careerpoliticians.html.
4. Justice John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts About a Former Colleague at Washington
University in St. Louis School of Law 10-16 (Apr. 25, 2016) (transcript available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/JPS%20Speech%20Washington%20University
%20in%20St%20Louis%20School%20of%20Law_04-25-2016.pdf).
5. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305 (2009); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011).
6. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
7. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. Jones, 565 U.S. at 400.
9. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
10. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
11. Jones, 565 U.S. at 400; Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
12. David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Justice Scalia Kept Constitutional Originalism in
the Conversation, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-oe-0216rivkin-casey-scalia-legacy-originalism-20160216-story.html.
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unabashed foe of criminal defendants, his Eighth Amendment
jurisprudential dealing with terms of imprisonment. There, based on his
reading of the historical record, he argued that the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not include a
proportionality principle and concluded that a term of imprisonment
need not be proportional to the underlying crime. 13 This Article
examines that conclusion from a number of perspectives and argues that
Justice Scalia was wrong about proportionality both as a matter of
historical understanding and as a matter of sound policy.
Part II reviews the leading cases in which the Court has established
that the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality principle in cases
involving terms of imprisonment. 14 It then turns to Justice Scalia’s
position in the cases in which the Court has addressed that issue during
his tenure on the Court. 15 For Justice Scalia, the matter was
straightforward: the original understanding of “cruel and unusual
punishment” did not include a proportionality principle in cases
involving terms of imprisonment. 16
In Part III, I discuss whether Justice Scalia’s conclusion was
correct. In fact, many historians disagree with his originalist analysis. 17
Indeed, as I argue below, that is not surprising. Most of us trained in the
law are not professional historians, and nothing taught us how to develop
a coherent historical methodology. 18 In effect, Justice Scalia got it wrong
in his proportionality case law because he engaged in “law office
history,” the selective reading of a few passages taken out of context.19
In Part IV, the Article turns to a separate question. Perhaps Justice
Scalia got it wrong in his proportionality case law. But maybe, overall,
his originalist methodology was worth pursuing. In answering that
question, one must address why courts should adhere to the Framers’
original understanding of constitutional language. In various
publications and elsewhere, Justice Scalia explained his adherence to
that methodology. 20 This section of the Article focuses on that

13. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 99 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962 (1991).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II, III.
16. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV 849, 862-64; ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38 (Princeton Univ.
Press 1997).
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explanation.
Specifically, I examine Justice Scalia’s explanation developed in an
article published in 1989 in which he called himself a “faint-hearted”
originalist. 21 Over time, he vacillated on the degree of his commitment
to originalism, eventually suggesting that his commitment was not so
faint-hearted. 22 But quite revealing was one of his primary justifications
for his adherence to original understanding: he saw his methodology as a
restraint on unelected federal judges. 23 Further, in his defense of
originalism, Justice Scalia argued that a number of principles justified
his abandonment of that methodology. 24
The last section of this Article turns to the question of
proportionality and asks whether that should have been an area, where
even if Justice Scalia’s historical analysis was correct, he should have
abandoned his methodology. I argue that he should have; Justice Scalia’s
professed deference to the legislative branch is inappropriate in the
criminal sentencing arena. 25 As others and I have argued, the legislative
process is not well suited to criminal sentencing. 26 Often enacted in
reaction to the crime of the day, 27 sentencing statutes may often result in
sentences that are draconian from a number of perspectives. At a
theoretical level, those sentences often far exceed the underlying
culpability and social harm produced by the offender’s conduct. 28 From
a pragmatic perspective, those sentences often far exceed the amount of
prison time needed to protect public safety. 29
II. JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE COURT’S VIEWS OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT’S PROPORTIONALITY PROVISION
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from imposing

21. Scalia, supra note 20, at 864.
22. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Oct. 6, 2013),
http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10.
23. Scalia, supra note 20, at 862.
24. Id. at 864.
25. See infra Part IV(b).
26. Michael Vitiello, “Three Strikes” and the Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores
Democracy 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643 (1997); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND
DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 3, 145, 222-24 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2001).
27. Michael Vitiello & Clark Kelso, A Proposal for Wholesale Reform of California’s
Sentencing Practice and Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 903, 916-17 (2004).
28. Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 427 (1997); ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 26, at 189-91.
29. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 26, at 3, 145, 189-91.
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cruel and unusual punishment and excessive bail and fines. 30 The Court
has held repeatedly that the Eighth Amendment requires that the
imposition of the death penalty be proportionate to the underlying
crime. 31 More controversial has been whether the Eighth Amendment
requires a term of imprisonment to be proportional to the underlying
crime.
The Supreme Court has addressed that question in a handful of
cases. 32 Shortly before Justice Scalia’s appointment to the bench, the
Court decided two cases that seemingly established that courts would
intervene if a term of imprisonment was grossly disproportionate to the
underlying crime. 33 For a period of time after Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined the Court, such claims failed consistently. 34 More
recently, a series of cases involving offenders who committed their
crimes as juveniles has established the principle that a term of
imprisonment grossly disproportionate to the underlying crime will
trigger judicial intervention under the Eighth Amendment. 35 Justice
Scalia consistently joined other justices who dissented in those cases. 36
In Rummel v. Estelle, a prisoner challenged the constitutionality of
his term of life in prison imposed under Texas’ recidivist statute. 37
Rummel, a repeat offender, was convicted of three nonviolent theft
offenses involving a total of less than $230 over a nine-year period. 38
Rummel relied primarily on Weems v. United States, one case in which
the Court found a term of imprisonment of fifteen years to be cruel and
unusual. 39 There, however, the offender, imprisoned in the Philippine
territory, was not only sentenced to a long term of imprisonment but was
forced to serve that time in chains at hard labor. 40 In Rummel, the deeply
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
31. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
32. John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 902-903 (2011); Michael Vitiello, California’s Three Strikes and We’re
Out: Was Judicial Activism California’s Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025, 1032 (2004).
33. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
34. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 957; Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
35. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
36. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Graham, 560 U.S. at 48 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
37. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266-67.
38. Id. at 265-66.
39. Id. at 272-78 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
40. In Weems, the Court stated:
Its minimum degree is confinement in a penal institution for twelve years and one day, a
chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance from
friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of property, no participation even in the family council. These parts of his penalty endure for the term of im-
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divided Court upheld the term of imprisonment in partial reliance on the
fact that Rummel would be eligible for parole within twelve years.41
However, the five-justice majority begrudgingly recognized that a term
of imprisonment might, under some extreme circumstances, amount to
cruel and unusual punishment. 42
Three terms later, the Court found that a term of imprisonment
violated the Eighth Amendment. In Solem v. Helm, another deeply
divided Court found that a true life sentence imposed on the prisoner
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment on the particular facts of that
case. 43 The offender, Helm, was sentenced to life without the possibility
of parole under South Dakota’s recidivism statute. 44 Although Helm’s
record was somewhat more serious than was Rummel’s, Helm’s record
involved a series of relatively minor, nonviolent felonies.45 Recognizing
that successful challenges to terms of imprisonment would be
exceedingly rare, the Court found that Helm’s true life sentence was
cruel and unusual. 46 On balance, the severity of the punishment far
exceeded the gravity of the offense. 47
Justice Powell’s Solem v. Helm majority opinion paralleled a wellrespected philosophy of punishment. Many commentators recognize that
no single justifying aim for punishment works well in all cases.48
Retributivism, for example, fails to explain why a fine of $100 is not
sufficient punishment for a person who has stolen $100. 49 Proponents of
deterrence face other conundrums; for example, they may have trouble
explaining why punishing the innocent is impermissible, even if it would

prisonment. From other parts there is no intermission. His prison bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from them to a perpetual limitation of
his liberty. He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept within voice
and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicil without giving
notice to the ‘authority immediately in charge of his surveillance,’ and without permission in writing.
217 U.S. at 358, 366.
41. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280-81.
42. Id. at 278-82, 282 n.27 (concluding that the term of imprisonment imposed on the
defendant before the Court was not excessive, implicitly recognizing that a term of imprisonment
might violate the Eighth Amendment).
43. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296-97 (1983).
44. Id. at 282 (citing S. D. CODIFIED L. § 22-7-8 (1979)).
45. Id. at 296-97.
46. Id. at 303.
47. Id. at 297.
48. JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW
58-61 (6th ed. 2012).
49. Id. at 57.
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deter large numbers of offenders. 50 They also must explain whether
extremely long sentences are justified for minor criminal acts if such
long sentences are the only means of deterring crime. 51 Similar to Justice
Powell’s approach, many commentators, and legislators, recognize many
competing aims for punishment. 52 But just desserts work as an outer
limit of punishment.53 Thus, Justice Powell’s approach allowed courts to
intervene when the punishment was too severe when compared to the
gravity of the offense. 54 In turn, the gravity of the offense reflected the
social harm and the offender’s culpability. 55
No doubt, the Court recognized limitations on a court’s ability to
review criminal sentences. On one hand, overly aggressive intervention
risked conflict between the courts and the legislature, which has the
primary responsibility for determining criminal sentences, and, on the
other, between the federal courts and the states, which are responsible
for enacting most criminal sentences.56 Nonetheless, Solem v. Helm
seemed to create promise for offenders in extreme cases. 57
Whatever hope prisoners had that the Court would expand its
proportionality review after Solem v. Helm was short-lived. Until recent
years, litigants raising proportionality challenges faced a far less
sympathetic Court than did Helm. Notably, by the time the Court
decided Harmelin v. Michigan 58 in 1991, Justice Scalia was on the Court
and Justice Kennedy had replaced Justice Powell on the bench. 59
In Harmelin, the offender was sentenced to a term of life in prison
without benefit of parole, the mandatory sentence for anyone found
guilty of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine. 60 Despite being
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 58-61
Id. at 58-59.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5 (2016); TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.02 (2015); DRESSLER &
GARVEY, supra note 48, at 58-59.
53. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER,
AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179-182 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.,
1987).
54. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983).
55. Id. at 292-94.
56. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998-99 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. I do not want to overstate how often judges would have intervened under the Court’s
approach in Solem v. Helm. Stinneford, supra note 32, at 913-14. But some courts, notably the
California Supreme Court for a period of time, have aggressively reviewed criminal sentences when
prisoners have raised claims of excessiveness. Vitiello, supra note 32, at 1029.
58. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 957.
59. Linda Greenhouse, Reagan Nominates Kennedy to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11,
1987),
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/12/us/reagan-nominates-anthony-kennedy-to-supremecourt.html?pagewanted=all.
60. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961.
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designated as the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia’s opinion represented
only his and the Chief Justice’s view. 61 Scalia would have overruled
Solem v. Helm and held that, outside the area of capital sentencing,
Eighth Amendment challenges are limited to the method of punishment,
not to a term of imprisonment. 62 At the core of his argument was his
belief that the Eighth Amendment as understood in 1791 outlawed only
methods of punishment. 63
Nevertheless, seven justices agreed that, under some limited
circumstances, terms of imprisonment triggered proportionality analysis;
four dissenting justices would have found Harmelin’s sentence
disproportionate under the Solem v. Helm analysis. 64 However, Justice
Kennedy concurred with the plurality opinion, and Justices O’Connor
and Souter joined him. 65 Justice Kennedy’s proportionality analysis
modified Justice Powell’s approach in one important respect: his
analysis rejected the need for Justice Powell’s inter- and intrajurisdictional analysis. 66 Specifically, Justice Powell compared the
punishment that a similar offender would receive in other jurisdictions
and the kinds of offenders that received the same punishment within the
same state. 67 Justice Kennedy found that component of Justice Powell’s
analysis unnecessary and held that, on balance, the offender’s culpability
was sufficient to justify the sentence imposed. 68
Beginning in the early 2000s and again in the next decade, the
Court returned to the question of whether particular sentences violated
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. It did so in cases where offenders were subjected to
extremely long—and as developed below, excessive—sentences that
resulted from public and legislative panic over crime rates. 69
California’s Three Strikes law, for instance, was a poorly designed
statute that resulted from the public’s distress over crime rates. I have
described the fraught climate in which California passed this draconian
statute in another article:
In 1992 Mike Reynolds, father of murder victim Kimber Reynolds,
61. Id.
62. Id. at 965.
63. Id. at 976, 983.
64. Id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting); Id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Id. at 1028
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 1005.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1008.
69. See infra Part IV.
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began a campaign to secure passage of one of the nation’s most
draconian multiple-offender statutes. When Reynolds first proposed
“three strikes” to the legislature, the Assembly Public Safety
Committee soundly defeated the bill. Reynolds’s subsequent efforts
may have failed but for the kidnapping and murder of twelve-year-old
Polly Klaas, whose plight galvanized the nation.
Richard Allen Davis, Polly’s admitted killer and a repeat offender,
symbolized the failure of the criminal justice system; Polly’s death was
a critical moment for “three strikes.” Within days of reports of her
murder, “three strikes” gathered 50,000 signatures and was on its way
to becoming the fastest qualifying voter initiative in California history.
The public’s support for the “three-strikes” initiative assured new
interest in the legislature when the bill’s proponents resubmitted it.
From the inception of “three strikes,” commentators along a wide
political spectrum raised serious questions about the legislation.
Nevertheless, the legislature passed “three strikes” by sizeable
majorities in both houses, and Californians voted in favor of the
initiative in overwhelming numbers. 70

Not long after its passage, aggressive prosecutions under the new law
gained the public’s attention. 71 Many voters must have wondered what
they had actually voted for when they saw cases involving trivial third
strikes. After all, the campaign literature suggested that the law was
aimed at murderers, rapists, and child molesters, not petty thieves. 72
One of the several problems with the law was that once an offender
had two qualifying serious or violent felonies, he was subject to a
minimum term of twenty-five years to life upon the conviction of any
third felony. 73 A case demonstrating the law’s extreme penalties made
its way to the Supreme Court in 2003. 74 Gary Ewing had a nine-year
history of crime that included a string of burglaries and robberies in
1993. 75 Those offenses qualified him for a third-strike sentence when he
was arrested for stealing three golf clubs from a golf pro shop. 76 The
trial court refused to strike a prior felony and sentenced Ewing to a term
of twenty-five years to life in prison. 77 After review by the state court of

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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appeals, Ewing sought review in the Supreme Court. 78
A deeply divided Court affirmed Ewing’s sentence. Writing for
herself and two other justices, Justice O’Connor found that Ewing’s
sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality
principle. 79 Four dissenting justices argued that the sentence violated
that principle as articulated in the Court’s earlier case law. 80 Justice
Thomas restated Justice Scalia’s position in Harmelin that the Eighth
Amendment does not include a proportionality principle. 81 Justice
Scalia’s discussion was curious. He repeated his conclusion that the
Eighth Amendment did not contain a proportionality provision.82
Nonetheless, he stated that, out of respect for stare decisis, he might
follow Solem v. Helm’s contrary principle. 83 Instead, however, he argued
that Solem v. Helm merely invites the Court to substitute its policy
analysis for that of the legislature. 84
In the 1990s, some criminologists predicted that a new generation
of criminal offenders would become “super-predators.” 85 Not unlike the
panic that led to passage of California’s Three Strikes law, many state
legislatures reacted out of fear of the new criminal menace. 86 Many
states enacted provisions that resulted in juvenile offenders being tried as
adults and that often led to sentences of life in prison without benefit of
parole. 87 Cases involving juvenile offenders eventually worked their way
to the Supreme Court.
In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court found that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits a state from sentencing a juvenile offender to a
true life sentence for a non-homicide offense. 88 Graham, a deeply
troubled youth, was raised by drug addicts and diagnosed with attention
deficit disorder at an early age. 89 He began his violent criminal career at
least as early as sixteen years old when he and friends made a botched

78. Id.
79. Id. at 30-31.
80. Id. at 35-36.
81. Id. at 32.
82. Id. at 31.
83. Id. at 31-32.
84. Id. at 32.
85. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Youth Crime – and What Not to Do About It, 31 VAL. U. L. REV.
435, 439-40 (1997); Michael Vitiello, The Expanding Use of Genetic and Psychological Evidence:
Finding Coherence in the Criminal Law?, 14 NEV. L. J. 897, 900-01 (2014).
86. James Herbie Difonzo, Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Crime, 80 OR. L. REV. 1, 1617 (2001).
87. Id.
88. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010).
89. Id. at 53.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss2/1

10

Vitiello: Scalia's Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence

2016]

SCALIA’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

185

armed-robbery attempt. 90 Not long thereafter, Graham was involved in a
serious home invasion robbery, for which the trial court sentenced him
to life without the possibility of parole.91
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy largely followed his
analysis from Harmelin. 92 He examined “the culpability of the offenders
at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the
severity of punishment in question.” 93 In that discussion, he also
assessed whether the state’s sentencing policy advanced legitimate
penological goals. 94 In reliance on his earlier majority opinion in Roper
v. Simmons, 95 Justice Kennedy argued “that because juveniles have
lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe
punishments.” 96 Further, as compared to adults, juveniles had a “lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.” 97 As a result,
juveniles are not categorically among the worst offenders. 98 The Court
also found no compelling penological justification that supported life
without the benefit of parole for juvenile offenders. 99
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court extended its Graham holding. 100
There, the juvenile offenders in Miller and a consolidated case, Jackson
v. Hobbs, were fourteen when they committed their crimes. 101 Both
juveniles were charged with murder, for which they were sentenced to
life without benefit of parole. 102 Writing for a divided Court, Justice
Kagan found that life without the benefit of parole for juvenile offenders
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 103 Thus, Graham and Miller underscore that the Court has
now recognized that the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality
principle in cases involving terms of years. 104
Justice Scalia joined dissents to the Court’s opinions in Graham

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
Id. at 74.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2455-58 (2012).
Id. at 2460.
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and Miller. 105 In both cases, the dissenters relied on Justice Scalia’s
original dissent in Harmelin. 106 That is, Justice Scalia held on to his
view that, as originally written, the Eighth Amendment did not include a
proportionality provision for terms of imprisonment. 107
Obviously, Justice Scalia’s supporters might point to his
consistency during his tenure on the Court. But, as developed below, his
position invites the question of whether his originalist analysis was
correct. 108
III. JUSTICE SCALIA’S ERRONEOUS READING OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
Some commentators have questioned Justice Scalia’s approach to
constitutional interpretation. 109 Even in what many of his supporters
consider a tour de force of original interpretation, Heller v. United
States, 110 some critics point out that Justice Scalia needed to abandon the
original understanding to resolve many of the questions raised by that
case. 111 Others have pointed out what some have called his “law office
history,” 112 questioning whether Justice Scalia’s analysis was
historically sound. 113
That Justice Scalia or other lawyers might not do good historical
work should hardly be surprising. We are not trained as historians. No
doubt, as some have argued, when lawyers do historical research, they
may seize upon out-of-context material and claim that it resolves the
historical debate. 114 Justice Scalia’s Harmelin opinion provides an
opportunity to examine whether he got history right.
105. Graham, 560 U.S. at 97 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
106. Graham, 560 U.S. at 99-100; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2483-86.
107. Graham, 560 U.S. at 99; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2486.
108. See infra Part III.
109. Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Harmelin’s Faulty Originalism, 14 NEV. L.J. 522, 522,
525-26, 528-29, 531-37, 540 (2014); Stinneford, supra note 32, at 938-42.
110. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Randy Barnett, News Flash: The
Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. JOURNAL (June 27, 2008),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121452412614009067. (“Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion
in yesterday’s Supreme Court decision in District of Columbia v. Heller is historic in its
implications and exemplary in its reasoning. . . . Justice Scalia’s opinion is the finest example of
what is now called ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court . . . .
“).
111. Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 639-40 (2008).
112. Id. at 626.
113. Id. at 625 n.3.
114. Id. at 626-27.
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A. The Harmelin Opinion
In the opinion, Justice Scalia canvassed the body of literature on the
question and rejected the limited authority that supported the conclusion
that the Eighth Amendment included a proportionality principle for
terms of imprisonment. 115 For some time, many scholars accepted that
conclusion. 116 More recently, however, scholars have raised doubts
about Justice Scalia’s reasoning. As Professor Michael Mannheimer
observed, at least since 2004, scholars have forced a rethinking of
whether the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality provision. 117
Both Professors John Stinneford and Mannheimer have laid out the
argument that Justice Scalia’s position was simply wrong. 118
Justice Scalia justified his conclusion that the Eighth Amendment
did not include a proportionality provision in reliance on five arguments.
The first argument focused on whether the English Bill of Rights of
1689, which was the source of the Eighth Amendment, included a
proportionality provision. 119
First, the English Bill of Rights’ provision was included as a
reaction to excesses of members of the King’s Bench. 120 Notably, Lord
Chief Justice Jeffreys sentenced Titus Oates, a Protestant cleric, to being
defrocked, fined, whipped, and sentenced to life in prison for his
perjured testimony in a treason trial against a number of Catholics
accused of plotting to assassinate the King. 121 After the adoption of the
English Bill of Rights, Oates asked Parliament to commute his
sentence. 122 The House of Commons agreed to do so, but the House of
Lords overruled the House of Commons. Members of the House of
Lords issued a written dissent. 123
Justice Scalia argued from the foregoing that the Eighth
Amendment did not include a proportionality provision. 124 As
summarized by Professor Mannheimer, Justice Scalia concluded that the
English Bill of Rights’ provision “‘was primarily a requirement that
judges pronouncing sentence remain within the bounds of common-law
tradition,’ unless a deviation from the common law was authorized by
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
Stinneford, supra note 32, at 926.
Mannheimer, supra note 109, at 522-23.
Id. at 540; Stinneford, supra note 32, at 907-08.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-68.
Mannheimer, supra note 109, at 526.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 527.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965-66.
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Parliament. He considered it ‘most unlikely’ that the Clause forbade
disproportionate punishments.” 125
Justice Scalia’s reading of the record is questionable. True, in part,
Oates’ sentence was beyond the judge’s power. 126 The Lord Chief
Justice, for example, lacked the power to order a cleric defrocked. 127 But
the punishment, as a logical matter, may also be outside a judge’s
common-law power because the punishment was excessive. 128 Indeed,
commentators have argued based on the same historical record that
Justice Scalia was wrong. 129 Again, as summarized by Mannheimer:
And Sir William Williams commented in the House of Commons that
what was objectionable about Oates’ punishment was the accumulation
of so many different aspects of punishment to be inflicted on one
person. Indeed, because fine, imprisonment, pillorying, and whipping
were all commonly used punishments at the time, the better view is
that it was the amount of punishment and the combination of
punishments that was thought contrary to the Clause. Accordingly,
“Justice Scalia’s attempt to separate the unprecedented nature of
Oates’s punishments from their excessiveness was mistaken.” The
punishments were beyond the judge’s power to impose because they
were excessive. 130

Justice Scalia also had to ignore other parts of the record, notably a
statement of the dissenting Lords that contradicted his conclusion. 131
Justice Scalia also argued that, in fact, Oates’ punishment was not
excessive. 132 His perjured testimony led to the execution of innocent
men. 133 Further, he argued that in the United States and in England,
many crimes short of murder were subject to the death penalty. 134
Neither point gets Justice Scalia very far, however. Under a
proportionality analysis, a sentence of death for intentional conduct
leading to another person’s death may be proportional. Indeed, that is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s current death-penalty case law.135
Further, that Congress might impose the death penalty for a variety of
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Mannheimer, supra note 109, at 527.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 529.
Id.
Id. at 528.
Id.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 969-75 (1991).
Id. at 969-70.
Id. at 974-75.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
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crimes does not negate the inclusion of a proportionality provision in the
Eighth Amendment as long as all felonies were not subject to the death
penalty. 136 Members of the First Congress seemed to have in mind some
kind of proportionality assessment: not all felonies deserved the same
punishment. 137
The penitentiary movement in Pennsylvania seemingly supports the
view that at least some policy makers in the eighteenth century were
committed to a proportionality principle. 138 By 1794, Quakers had
convinced the Pennsylvania legislature to create two degrees of
murder. 139 Only first-degree murder, a premeditated killing, would lead
to the death penalty. Otherwise, offenders were subject to terms of
imprisonment. 140
Second, Justice Scalia relied on statements of opponents of the
Constitution that he claimed supported his view. He quoted Abraham
Holmes and Patrick Henry’s comments in opposition to the adoption of
the Constitution that seemed to support his view that the Constitution
addressed only the method of punishment. 141 But this support runs afoul
as “law office history.” 142 Without a more searching historical inquiry,
one ought not to assume that two dissenters’ views stood for the broader
understanding of the Eighth Amendment or the Constitution more
generally. 143 In addition, even Justice Scalia’s use of Patrick Henry’s
speech ignored other arguments that Henry made. 144
Third, in Harmelin, Justice Scalia also relied on language from state
constitutions that clearly established their commitment to proportionality
and argued that the different textual language in the Eighth Amendment
proved that its drafters rejected the principle.145 For example, the
Pennsylvania Constitution, similar to those of other states, makes
explicit that punishments be made “in general more proportionate to the
crimes.” 146 Given that language and the fact that some state constitutions
included both a provision requiring proportional punishment and one
banning cruel and unusual punishment, Justice Scalia concluded that the
136. Mannheimer, supra note 109, at 524-25.
137. Id. at 530.
138. Cary Bricker & Michael Vitiello, Chinese Homicide Law, Irrationality, and Incremental
Change, 27 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 43, 55 (2013).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991).
142. Cornell, supra note 111, at 626.
143. Mannheimer, supra note 109, at 530-31.
144. Id.
145. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 982-83.
146. Id. at 977.
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two protections are not the same. 147 Additionally, he found that the
Eighth Amendment’s express inclusion of a ban on excessive fines
supported the conclusion that proportionality and cruel and unusual
punishments are distinct concepts. 148
Justice Scalia ignored counter arguments. For example, as
summarized by Mannheimer,
It is true that the Excessive Fines Clause might be read to forbid this
type of disproportionality. But there is persuasive evidence that that
Clause was intended also to forbid a wholly different kind of
disproportionality: excessiveness of fines in relation to the defendant’s
ability to pay. At common law, one who could not pay a fine was
imprisoned until he was able to pay. Thus, absent a ban on the
imposition of fines that are beyond the ability of the defendant to pay,
any offense for which a fine is a prescribed punishment could in reality
be punished by indefinite—even perpetual—imprisonment. Indeed, the
history of England is replete with such examples. 149

Recent scholarship has also suggested that the Excessive Fines Clause
was not aimed only at assessing a fine in relationship to the underlying
offense but also to determine whether the fine would impair the
offender’s ability to make a living. 150 In either case, contrary to Justice
Scalia’s conclusion, the two clauses are not redundant even if the
framers intended “cruel and unusual punishment” to include a
proportionality component. 151
Fourth, Justice Scalia found support for his narrow reading of the
Eighth Amendment in contemporary judicial rulings. 152 For example, he
relied on one New York trial court that referred to the Eighth
Amendment without engaging in a proportionality analysis. 153 He failed
to acknowledge that the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case
the following year, and while it affirmed the trial court, it did so in part
because the Eighth Amendment was inapplicable to the states.154 His
reliance on other state law cases is also questionable; many of them were
decided long after the adoption of the Eighth Amendment and others

147. Id. at 976-78.
148. Id. at 978-80.
149. Mannheimer, supra note 109, at 532.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 532-33.
152. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 982.
153. Id. at 982-83 (citing Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823), aff’d, 3 Cow.
686 (N.Y. 1824)).
154. Mannheimer, supra note 109, 534-35.
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dealt with state constitutional protections.155 As suggested above, Justice
Scalia’s efforts to define original public understanding seems to be an
exercise in “law office history.”
Finally, his reliance on contemporary commentators for support is
also open to serious criticism. Professor Mannheimer has demonstrated
that Justice Scalia committed two original sins. First, he read some
statements as fully supporting his position without recognizing
ambiguity in the selected passages. 156 Second, he ignored contrary
material. For example, he cited Justice Story’s work, but ignored
language suggesting that the Eighth Amendment did include a
proportionality principle. 157 And he simply ignored Thomas Cooley’s
discussion of the issue in 1868, contemporaneous with the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which was the vehicle for extending the Bill
of Rights to the states. 158
Finally, Mannheimer examined the legislation of several States that
attempted to ratify the 1783 Confederal Impost Resolution under the
Articles of Confederation for support that the Eighth Amendment
included a proportionality principle. 159 As he observed, at least six states
included language that was a precursor to the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.160 Mannheimer reasoned that,
because this language was included to constrain Congress’ power to
punish evaders of the impost, it was clear that “cruel and unusual” in that
context referred to punishment that was disproportionate in some way,
rather than to the method of punishment. 161
In summary, Justice Scalia’s historical analysis unravels upon
closer examination. At best, a closer look at what historians have to say
on the subject weakens confidence in his conclusion. That is not
surprising. Further criticism of his originalism analysis surrounds his
opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller.

155. Id. at 535.
156. Id. at 536.
157. Id. at 537 (Justice Scalia failed to acknowledge language from Justice Story’s
Commentaries that undercut his argument by demonstrating that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause did address proportionality. Specifically, having just discussed the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, Justice Story stated that “[u]pon this subject, Mr. Justice Blackstone has wisely
remarked that sanguinary laws are a bad symptom of the distemper of any state”).
158. Id. (“Thomas Cooley wrote that ‘probably any new statutory offence may be punished to
the extent and in the mode permitted by the common law for offences of similar nature.’”).
159. Id. at 538.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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B. The Heller Opinion
Although many of Justice Scalia’s supporters view the Heller
opinion as his most important contribution to original
understanding 162—which is plausible on first reading, because at 17,000
words the decision seems like a tour de force of historical analysis 163—
critics have pointed to at least two flaws in the decision. These two flaws
in Justice Scalia’s Second Amendment analysis reveal similar
weaknesses in his Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence.
One problem with Justice Scalia’s historical analysis was that he
could not resolve the dispute before the Court merely in reliance on
contemporary understanding of the words of the Second Amendment. 164
Most notably, he found that the Second Amendment protected owners of
handguns for purposes of self-defense. 165 By contrast, other forms of
weapons such as tanks and other military weapons were not within the
meaning of the Second Amendment. 166 Such a ruling had to rely on facts
never within the understanding of the drafters of the Second Amendment
or within public understanding of the contemporaneous language of the
Second Amendment. 167
The second and more substantial problem with Justice Scalia’s
Heller analysis was that his history was inaccurate. Saul Cornell,
Professor of History at The Ohio State University, summarized the core
criticisms of Justice Scalia’s conclusion in Heller in Originalism on
Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller. 168
For example, in Heller, Justice Scalia rejected reliance on nineteenthcentury legal commentator Benjamin Oliver. According to Justice
Scalia, Oliver was the only contemporary commentator he found who
supported the conclusion that the Second Amendment was to apply to
militia-related activities only. Cornell found Scalia’s rejection of Oliver
to be a “glib dismissal.” 169 Oliver, according to Cornell, “was among the
most prolific and influential popular legal writers of his day.” 170 Indeed,
Oliver was one of Justice Story’s protégés and co-authored an important
162. See, e.g., Eric Posner, The Tragedy of Antonin Scalia, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/the_tragedy_of_antonin_sc
alia.html.
163. Cornell, supra note 111, at 626.
164. Id. at 627-28.
165. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 616 (2008).
166. Id. at 627.
167. Cornell, supra note 111, at 629.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 627.
170. Id. at 628.
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legal reference with the Justice. 171
Beyond failing to recognize Oliver’s import, Justice Scalia also
misstated the record: Oliver was not the only nineteenth century
commentator who saw the Second Amendment as limited to militiarelated activity. 172 Again, according to Professor Cornell, Justice Story
shared Oliver’s view. 173
Further, in Heller, Justice Scalia relied on the works of others in
interpreting the Second Amendment. Among those sources were articles
by two prominent law professors, Eugene Volokh 174 and Randy
Barnett. 175 Both are intelligent and highly-regarded scholars, 176 but at
least according to their published resumes, neither is a trained
historian. 177 Not surprisingly, professional historians like Cornell
question their historical analysis. 178 For example, Cornell observes that
Professor Volokh’s thesis, relied on by Justice Scalia, “had been
thoroughly discredited by historian David Konig in an important
Essay.” 179 Among other comments about Professor Barnett’s historical
work, Cornell observes that “[w]hat is particularly shocking is that
Barnett’s analysis of the opinion confuses historical contextualism (the
methodology employed by most historians) with Justice Steven’s
originalist methodology, an approach most historians reject. Curiously,
Barnett seems unaware that most historians are militantly antioriginalist.” 180
That historians would find Justice Scalia’s or Professors Volokh
and Barnett’s analyses wanting should not be surprising. They, similar to

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577, 597 (2008) (citing Eugene Volokh,
The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 793, 814-21 (1998); Eugene Volokh,
Necessary to the Security of a Free State, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5 (2007)).
175. Heller, 554 U.S. at 587 (citing Randy Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms
Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 237, 261 (2004) (book
review)).
176. Preston Lerner, Right Side of the Law: Eugene Volokh’s Global Influence, L.A.
MAGAZINE (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/right-side-law-eugene-volokhsglobal-influence/; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Charlie Savage, Vindication for Challenger of Health
Care Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/randy-barnetts-petcause-end-of-health-law-hits-supreme-court.html.
177. Eugene Volokh, FACULTY PROFILE U.C.L.A. LAW, http://law.ucla.edu/faculty/facultyPROFILE
GEORGETOWN
LAW,
profiles/eugene-volokh;
Randy
Barnett,
FACULTY
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/barnett-randy-e.cfm.
178. Cornell, supra note 111, at 630.
179. Id. at 633.
180. Id. at 626.
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almost everyone else practicing law, were trained as lawyers, not as
historians. We are not likely to be trained in how to read original
sources. 181 As observed by Professor Cornell, many leading historians
reject the originalist methodologies used by judges and legal scholars.
According to Gordon Wood, who was “perhaps the leading historian on
the Founding Era”, 182 “It may be necessary for lawyers and jurists to
believe in a ‘correct’ or ‘true’ interpretation of the Constitution in order
to carry on their business, but we historians have different obligations
and aims.” 183 Historians typically find wanting the kind of historical
analysis that lawyers engage in; that is true whether it is Justice Scalia’s
or Justice Stevens’s analysis. For example, as Professor Cornell
observed, those engaging in originalist analysis “cherry pick quotes and
present this amateurish research as systematic historical inquiry.” 184
IV. ABANDONING ORIGINALISM
To this point, I have explored whether Justice Scalia’s originalist
position in Harmelin was correct. 185 If Justice Scalia got it wrong in
Heller, his tour de force of originalist analysis, one should not be
surprised if he was mistaken in Harmelin as well. As Professors
Mannheimer and Stinneford have argued, Justice Scalia was wrong. 186
But assume for a moment that his analysis was correct and that the
Eighth Amendment did not include a proportionality provision. Should
Justice Scalia have followed his historical understanding of the Eighth
Amendment or abandoned it?
That may seem like an odd question to ask about Justice Scalia. He
was after all an originalist. But originalists do not always follow the
original understanding of the Constitution. Indeed, not long after his
appointment to the Court, Justice Scalia described himself as a “fainthearted” originalist. 187 Some commentators have suggested that during
his tenure on the Court, he became a more deeply-committed
originalist. 188 Justice Scalia said as much in one interview. 189
181. Id. at 626-27.
182. Id. at 626.
183. Gordon Wood, Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America, 44 WM. MARY Q. 628, 63233 (1987) (book review).
184. Cornell, supra note 111, at 627.
185. See supra Part III.
186. See supra Part III.
187. Scalia, supra note 20, at 864.
188. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
189. Jeffrey Rosen, What Made Antonin Scalia Great, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 2016),
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Nevertheless, no one can claim that Justice Scalia was committed only to
original understanding. 190 Numerous examples come to mind where he
could make no claim that he was following the original understanding of
the Constitution. Justice Scalia’s fuzzy equal protection argument in
Bush v. Gore, for example, seems ungrounded in any nineteenth-century
understanding of voting rights. 191
Even after Justice Scalia became a more deeply-committed
originalist, he abandoned that commitment in specific cases. Thus, his
earlier explanation for why he would abandon original understanding
remains relevant. This section reviews his explanation and then argues
that, based on his prior explanation, he should have abandoned the
original understanding of cruel and unusual punishment in cases such as
Harmelin and Ewing. 192
A. Originalism: The Lesser Evil
Not long after his appointment to the bench, Justice Scalia
delivered a lecture on originalism at the University of Cincinnati which
was thereafter published in its law review. 193 There, in what has come to
be called the “Taft lecture,” Justice Scalia laid out his arguments for why
he was an originalist and also why he would abandon the original
understanding in some cases.
In his Taft lecture, Justice Scalia exposed some of the difficulties
with originalism. 194 But in the end, Justice Scalia explained why he
opted for originalism. In his words, it is the lesser of two evils. 195 His
most powerful justification is his belief that adherence to the original
understanding of constitutional language protects against justices’
substitution of their own values for those of the people. 196 As he stated,
[O]riginalism seems to me more compatible with the nature and
purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system. A democratic society
does not, by and large, need constitutional guarantees to insure that its
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/what-made-antonin-scalia-great/462837.
190. Dan Slater, Scalia Justifies His Jurisprudence: ‘I am Not a Nut,’ WALL ST. JOURNAL
(Apr. 8, 2008, 9:17 PM), http://www.blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/04/08/scalia-justifies-hisjurisprudence-i-am-not-a-nut/ (quoting Scalia: “I am a textualist, I am an originalist. I am not a
nut.”).
191. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000); Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?,
68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925, 961-68 (2007).
192. See infra Part IV(b).
193. Scalia, supra note 20, at 849.
194. Id. at 856.
195. Id. at 862.
196. Id.
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laws will reflect “current values.” Elections take care of that quite well.
The purpose of constitutional guarantees—and in particular those
constitutional guarantees of individual rights that are at the center of
this controversy—is precisely to prevent the law from reflecting
certain changes in original values that the society adopting the
Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable. Or, more precisely, to
require the society to devote to the subject the long and hard
consideration required for a constitutional amendment before those
particular values can be cast aside. 197

Justice Scalia’s point is an important one. One ought to agree as a
general matter that justices should be wary about substituting their own
values for those of a majority of Americans. 198
Beyond Justice Scalia’s belief in originalism to be the lesser of two
evils, he also explained why he would abandon the original
understanding of the Constitution. First, judges under the constitutional
scheme should be followers of the law. 199 But in some instances,
constitutional language does not provide sufficient guidance. 200 Second,
notable cases such as Marbury v. Madison 201 present an originalist with
a difficult choice. 202 The result of such cases may be contrary to the
original understanding, but the principle of stare decisis may compel
adherence to settled precedent.203 Third, Justice Scalia observed that he
might abandon the original understanding of the Constitution if it would
produce a sufficiently objectionable result. He offered the example of
flogging, something that might not be cruel and unusual punishment
within the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment, but
nonetheless so objectionable that he would not uphold such a practice. 204
While Justice Scalia substituted his values for those of the majority
in some famous cases, I will take his commitment to democracy
seriously. Below, I explore why, given his explanation for why he
favored originalism and when he would deviate from its command, he
should have rejected his narrow view of the Eighth Amendment even if
he had been correct in his conclusion about its meaning. 205

197. Id.
198. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 PUB. L. 279, 282 (1957).
199. Scalia, supra note 20, at 863.
200. Id.
201. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
202. Scalia, supra note 20, at 861.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See infra Part IV(b).
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B. Failure of Democracy
How might Justice Scalia have viewed whether to abandon the
original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, even if we were to assume
that that his version of the historical reading of the Amendment was
correct?
Although, in his concurring opinion in Ewing v. California, Justice
Scalia briefly discussed possible adherence to stare decisis, he found the
Court’s use of a proportionality principle too vague in Solem v. Helm. 206
Instead, Justice Scalia concluded that Solem v. Helm merely invited
judges to substitute their own values for legislative determinations.207 He
might also have observed that the relevant precedent was not all that
strong. Prior to more recent cases similar to Miller and Graham, the
Court had seldom struck down terms of imprisonment on proportionality
grounds. 208 Certainly, the principle is not as embedded in the case law as
is Marbury v. Madison’s concept of judicial review.
At the same time, Justice Scalia’s own example—that he would
strike down a law allowing flogging even if the practice did not run
afoul of the original understanding of cruel and unusual punishment—
suggests that he was open to abandoning a narrow historical reading of
the Eighth Amendment. 209 In the same breath, he doubted that such a
case would arise, presumably because no legislature would enact such a
law. 210
But do legislatures enact such laws? And if so, is that a sufficient
justification to abandon original understanding? At the core of his
adherence to originalism was his concern about a judge substituting his
or her own values for those of a majority of Americans. 211 And if
legislatures enact such extreme laws, who is Justice Scalia to substitute
his values for those of elected officials? If such laws are extreme, let the
political process correct those excesses. 212 That might seem to be how
Justice Scalia would explain his rejection of a proportionality principle
in cases such as Harmelin. 213
Here is where I believe Justice Scalia has it wrong, even on the
assumption that his historical analysis was correct. Obviously, Justice
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
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Scalia, like every other justice on the Court, voted during his tenure on
the Court to overturn legislation that he found in violation of the
Constitution. 214 Presumably, justices have some guiding principles for
when they will overrule the will of the people as reflected in legislation.
Excessive punishment calls out for judicial intervention because the
political process does not work well to protect criminal defendants’
rights.
Take two examples I used above. 215 California’s Three Strikes law
is indicative of the failure of the political process to apportion
punishment justly. 216 As I, and others, have written, California’s voters
and legislature adopted its draconian law at a time of moral outrage at
the kidnapping and murder of twelve-year-year-old Polly Klaas. 217
Similarly, many of the laws subjecting offenders who committed
offenses as juveniles to adult prosecution and severe sentences have
been the product of public panic about “super-predators.” 218 Media
sources often enflame public passions about crime. 219 For example,
Americans continued to believe that crime rates were increasing even
during a prolonged period of declining crime rates. 220
Ample evidence supports the fact that such laws yield unnecessarily
long sentences without corresponding decreases in crime rates or
increases in public safety. Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes
and You’re Out in California, published in 2001, remains the best
empirical study of the effects of the Three Strikes law. 221 Its authors
concluded that the law was at best responsible for a miniscule amount of
the decline in crime rates in California. 222 Further, the law resulted in
long sentences that exceeded the need to incapacitate aging felons.223
Indeed, such laws lead to misallocation of resources, resulting in bloated
prison costs. 224 Unless one assumes naively that funds are unlimited,
spending money on prisons takes resources away from other more
effective ways to reduce crime, including increasing the chances of

214. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2615 (2013).
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216. Vitiello, supra note 26, at 1602-05.
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220. Id. at 417.
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arrest and using more resources for reintegration programs. 225
Similarly, laws that lock up juvenile offenders for life are likely to
incarcerate juveniles well passed their criminal years. As has been
observed often, crime, especially violent crime, is a young man’s
game. 226 After about thirty years of age, offenders phase out of their
criminal conduct. 227
Justice Scalia seemed to believe that the solution to overuse of
incarceration was legislative. 228 Let democracy work. But does it work
in the area of criminal sentencing? Punishment and Democracy made a
compelling case that we are better served by insulating sentencing
decisions from direct democracy. The authors argue that given the way
in which criminal sentencing laws are enacted, sentences are likely to be
excessive. 229 And of course, the authors’ empirical research, showing
that three-strikes laws lead to sentences that are far longer than needed
for public safety, demonstrates the fact that such sentences are
excessive. 230
Elsewhere, Western societies, such as the United States, insulate
some decisions from the political process when experience demonstrates
that democracy leads to bad results. As discussed in Punishment and
Democracy, every Western democracy insulates monetary policy from
popular control, and in the United States, we have relied on the Federal
Reserve System since 1913. 231 One justification for the decision to
insulate monetary policy from the electorate is that democratically
responsive institutions produce undesirable levels of inflation. 232
My point as it relates to Justice Scalia’s originalism is this: his
central premise for adherence to originalism was his belief in
democracy. 233 Given his willingness to abandon originalism in some
cases, I suggest that when democracy does not work well, the Court has
a role in protecting individuals harmed. 234 That is hardly a radical
225. Michael Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration: Why Is California Lagging Behind?, 28
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1275, 1284 (2012) [hereinafter Alternatives to Incarceration]; Michael Vitiello,
Reforming California Sentencing Practice and Policy: Are We There Yet?, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV.
685, 689 (2014) [hereinafter Reforming California].
226. Vitiello, supra note 28, at 437.
227. Id.
228. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 550 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 26, at 194.
230. Id. at 66-74.
231. Id. at 204.
232. Id. at 205.
233. See supra Part IV(b).
234. Paul Gewirtz, The Pragmatic Passion of Stephen Breyer, 115 YALE L.J. 1675, 1675
(2006).
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notion.
Justice Scalia might have disagreed, concluding instead that
legislatures would act to reform excessive sentencing schemes. He might
point to recent efforts at reform around the country. 235 As I have pointed
out elsewhere, a broad political consensus favoring reform has emerged.
Indeed, in some conservative states, legislatures have enacted
meaningful reforms. 236
That position, however, ignores two important points. First, despite
a broad consensus favoring reform, many states and the Federal
Government have not enacted wholesale reform. 237 Illustrative are
efforts in Congress to pass reform where a broad consensus seems to be
in place. 238 As I write this Article in the summer of 2016, those efforts
seem to have stalled. 239 Many Assistant United States Attorneys have
opposed reform. 240 Recently, one senator has opposed a bill that would
reduce mandatory minimum sentences. 241 Headlines in the news declare
reform dead for this year. 242 If one doubts the complex politics of
sentencing reform, she should examine how difficult reform has been in
California, a typically liberal state, where only through efforts of a threejudge panel of federal judges has tepid reform become a reality. 243 For
example, even under pressure from the three-judge panel, the California
legislature has resisted putting in place a sentencing commission or
undoing the excesses of its Three Strikes law. 244 Indeed, politicians of all
stripes in California seem unwilling to take a lead in wholesale
reform. 245

235. Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 225, at 1287.
236. Id. at 1289.
237. Marc Mauer, Sentencing Reform Amid Mass Incarceration—Guarded Optimism, 26
CRIM. JUST. 27, 28-29 (2011).
238. Editorial Board, Holding Sentencing Reform Hostage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/opinion/sunday/holding-sentencing-reformhostage.html?_r=0.
239. Id.
240. Steven Nelson, Prosecutors Rally against Sentencing Reform, Say Build More Prisons,
U.S. NEWS (Jul. 17, 2015, 3:36 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/17/prosecutorsrally-against-sentencing-reform-say-build-more-prisons.
241. Nick Gass, Sen. Tom Cotton: U.S. has ‘under-incarceration problem,’ POLITICO (May
19, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/tom-cotton-under-incarceration-223371.
242. Editorial Board, supra note 239; David Hawkings, ‘Sentencing Reform’ is Seriously
Stuck, ROLL CALL (May 12, 2016), http://www.rollcall.com/news/hawkings/serious-troublesentencing-bill.
243. Reforming California, supra note 225, at 729-30.
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Second, even if meaningful legislative reform eventually occurs in
any given state, many prisoners have served excessive sentences.246 For
example, in 2012, California’s voters passed an initiative curtailing some
of the excesses of its Three Strikes law. 247 The law did allow retroactive
application of its provisions for some offenders. 248 Despite that, the law
was little consolation for offenders who served unnecessary years in
prison. Prisoners, often disenfranchised as a result of their felony
convictions, have little political clout. 249 Further, imprisonment is also
likely to leave offenders’ families with few resources and without
resources to lobby in favor of sentencing reform. 250 As a result, any
claim that prisoners’ recourse is the democratic process rings hollow.
As developed above, Justice Scalia found originalism attractive
because of its ability to limit unelected judges from imposing their
values on society. 251 My point here is that, when democracy cannot
provide an adequate remedy for measurable harm, Justice Scalia’s
rationale pales. Thus, based on Justice Scalia’s rationale, even if his
historical analysis were correct, his justification for originalism should
have led him to find a proportionality principle in the Eighth
Amendment. 252
V. CONCLUSION
This symposium’s editors have posed a fascinating question: Was
Justice Scalia a friend or foe to criminal defendants? As discussed
briefly by way of introduction, in some areas, the record is
complicated. 253 Notably, his Fourth Amendment case law is mixed, at
times expanding protections but often contracting protections. 254 By
contrast, his Eighth Amendment position makes him an unequivocal foe
of criminal defendants.
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No doubt, Justice Scalia’s defenders justify his position in cases
like Harmelin and Ewing as consistent with the original understanding
of the Eighth Amendment. 255 But an emerging body of literature casts
doubt on his conclusion that the Eighth Amendment did not include a
proportionality provision. 256 Further, his questionable analysis invites a
broader discussion of lawyers’ and judges’ ability to do historical
analysis. Without training in historical methodology, judges and lawyers
are likely to come to erroneous conclusions and to engage in “law office
history.” 257
Beyond that, justices do not adhere to a single methodology in all
cases. Justice Scalia admitted as much.258 This Article has argued that,
even had Justice Scalia’s historical analysis been correct, he should have
abandoned that analysis in his Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 259
Criminal sentencing calls for judicial intervention because it is likely to
be an area where the political process will result in excessive sentences
and will leave prisoners with no meaningful political power to reform
the laws’ excesses.
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